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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Sadler, Donald Fac~lity: Sullivan CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 96-A-6725 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
09-022-18 B 
Appearances: Jason Sautter Esq. 
23 West Main Street 
Middletown, New York 10940 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 
months. ' 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Cruse, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Pap.ers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived March 8, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentenoe Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ·-Modified to ___ _ 
2 ~7 
·1f the Final Determination is at varian~e with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any1 on.....,J.,~~<-So--=..:=- .. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Sadler, Donald DIN: 96-A-6725  
Facility: Sullivan CF AC No.:  09-022-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 6) 
 
     Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant’s current crime of conviction is Murder 2nd Degree by 
striking a  female  about the head, and then choking her to death.  Appellant raises the following 
issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors. Appellant has an excellent institutional record and 
is rehabilitated. 2) the Board failed to satisfy the burden of proof or  prove its case by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 3) the decision violates his constitutional liberty interest in a 
legitimate expectation of release. 4) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 
5) the decision failed to offer facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 6) the decision lacks 
details. 7) the decision lacks future guidance. 8) no aggravating factors exist. 9) the decision 
ignored the minimum sentence sought by the court and illegally resentenced him. 10)  the decision 
was predetermined. 11) the Board never explained how they weighed the factors. 12) the Board 
failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that no written procedures 
exist, the COMPAS was ignored, and the statutes are now future and rehabilitation focused. 
 
    Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
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Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
    “[T]he serious nature of the crimes for which the [inmate] was incarcerated and his prior 
criminal record [ ] are sufficient grounds to deny parole release.”  Matter of Scott v. Russi, 208 
A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d. Dept. 1994); see also Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 
1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014); Matter 
of Thurman v. Hodges, 292 A.D.2d 872, 873, 739 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Wright v. Travis, 284 A.D.2d 544, 727 N.Y.S.2d 630 
(2d Dept. 2001). 
    The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of 
Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry 
plans in case immigration does not deport inmate); Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec. 
Dep’t Div. of Parole Appeals Unit, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate 
release plan). 
     The Board may take into account an inmate’s mental health when denying parole release.  See 
Matter of Dudley v. Travis, 227 A.D.2d 863, 642 N.Y.S.2d 386 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 
812, 649 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1996); Matter of Baker v. Russi, 188 A.D.2d 771, 591 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d 
Dept. 1992); see also Pender v. Travis, 243 A.D.2d 889, 662 N.Y.S.2d 642 (3d Dept. 1997), lv. 
denied, 91 N.Y.2d 810, 670 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1998); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Dept. 
of Correctional Services, Parole Bd. Div., 67 A.D.2d 1108, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dept. 1979), 
appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 707, 418 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979); Rodriguez v. Henderson, 56 A.D.2d 
729, 730, 392 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 801, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1025 
(1977). 
     The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000).  There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
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Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000).  Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty.  
See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d 
Dept. 1985). 
 
     That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    As for appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
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2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
        Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty 
interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     The inmate may not review the Board’s weighing process or  assess whether the Board gave 
proper weight to the relevant factors, since it is not required to state each factor it considers, or 
weigh each factor equally or grant parole due to exemplary behavior. Comfort v New York State 
Division of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3rd Dept. 2009); Hamilton v New York 
State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). The due process 
clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be 
second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
     There are no substantial evidence or preponderance of the evidence issues in a Parole Board 
Release Interview. Valderrama v Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); 
Tatta v Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept. 2006)  lv.den. 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 
N.Y.S.2d 750; Harris v New York State Division of Parole, 211 A.D.2d 205, 628 N.Y.S.2d 416 
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(3d Dept. 1995).   A substantial evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been 
held and evidence has been taken pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. 
Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine 
whether an inmate should be released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 
159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). The regulation cited by appellant applies to 
parole revocation hearings, and not Parole Board Release Interviews. 
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State 
Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
     Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 
enacted regulations are the written procedures. The 2017 amended regulations don’t create any 
substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts 
must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and 
not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 
2018).  
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Sadler, Donald DIN: 96-A-6725  
Facility: Sullivan CF AC No.:  09-022-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 6 of 6) 
 
     The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other 
statutory factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result, and declining to afford the COMPAS controlling 
weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must 
weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are 
satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d 
Dept. 2014). 
    .  Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal 
regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this 
proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest 
change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which 
governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The Board still must conduct a case-by-
case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 
866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department has “take[n] the unusual step of 
affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he 
Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight” and rejected 
any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning 
over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 
22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).  Notably, the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law did not change the 
three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant 
parole, namely (1) whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he 
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether release “is not incompatible 
with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so deprecate the seriousness of his 
crime as to undermine respect for law.” See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Even uniformly low 
COMPAS scores and other evidence of rehabilitation would not resolve the broader questions of 
society’s welfare, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, or whether release would 
undermine respect for the law.       
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
